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Between the Waves: Currents in Contemporary
Feminist Thought
Ros Hague
Nottingham Trent University
With a continuing focus on liberal feminism, Marxist feminism and essentialism, one would be forgiven for
thinking that feminist theory is unable to break free from the ‘second wave’. This is not the case. This article
reviews three books which take on these feminist issues and offer new readings on the questions at the heart of
feminism. Each provides clear links to feminism of the past but also connects to present debate and makes
suggestions for future directions for feminism. There is plenty of literature which bemoans the end of feminism and
some which triumphantly hails our era as post-feminist: no longer in need of feminist theory. Contrary to such
claims, each book tackles the problem of women’s oppression from a different perspective, each presents different
solutions and in so doing they demonstrate that feminism is alive and well.
Abbey, R. (2011) The Return of Feminist Liberalism. Durham: Acumen.
Weeks, K. (2011) The Problem with Work: Feminism, Marxism, Antiwork Politics and Postwork Imaginaries. Durham,
NC: Duke University Press.
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The three books reviewed here engage with ideas rooted in earlier thinking (liberal
feminism, Marxist feminism and essentialism), but they provide innovative critical per-
spectives and new types of evidence in an ongoing debate over issues which simply will
not and should not go away. They advance feminist works of the late 1990s and early
2000s in rejecting and moving beyond the binary categorisations of equality/difference,
sex/gender and public/private (see, e.g., Hutchings, 2003; Prokhovnik, 2002).
There is considerable debate over ‘where feminism is at’, especially in the literature
dealing with key concerns of ‘third wave feminists’ (Budgeon, 2011; Gillis et al., 2005).
An apparent rupture between ‘third and second wavers’ (Siegel, 2007) is under debate,
while Clare Hemmings (2005) provides a critique of how the overall history of feminism
is represented. Both Deborah Siegel and Hemmings highlight the importance of the
relationship between ongoing feminist concerns and earlier theories. A perennial problem
for second wave feminism was the question of women’s identity: should feminism treat
women as a group? This approach was criticised for its tendency towards the exclusion
of some women and for taking the experience of white, Western, middle-class women
to be the common experience of all women. What then of the alternative approach – to
treat women as individuals rather than as one group? This, a largely liberal feminist
approach, was criticised for its abstraction of women from their real experience of
everyday life, denying the significance of any particular identity and the possibility that
different women will experience the same phenomenon differently. The question of
women’s identity has been visited in several interrelated forms in the second wave:
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essentialism (a debate on whether or not women share common features by virtue of
being a woman), intersectionality (the argument that sex-based oppression does not occur
separately to or exclusively from other socially and culturally constructed categories such
as race or class) and the shifting focus from equality to difference (tackling inequality
requires respect for difference and diversity among women). These issues of identity remain
key themes for feminist theory. For Hemmings the story of feminism should not be the
story of one school of thought displacing another; rather we should draw links between
the common feminist features of these approaches and treat feminism ‘as a series of
ongoing contests and relationships’ (Hemmings, 2005, p. 131). That feminist theorising
is diverse and multifaceted should be seen as a good thing, and the three books discussed
here show that there are still important political issues which demand the attention of
feminists. In different ways, they demonstrate that political and social problems, and
responses to them, do not rise up out of a void, but are part of an ongoing conversation
with the feminist theory of the past, upon which may be built theories about the future.
Most of all, they either directly or indirectly refute the claims of ‘post-feminism’, the
notion that we somehow live in ‘post-patriarchy’ (Siegel, 2007, p. 126). In other words,
they demonstrate that we still need feminist theory. More specifically, we need feminist
theory to deal with its own problems – problems of which we are well aware, especially
feminism’s (in) ability to engage with the social and political oppression of all women.
While it is not particularly useful to categorise feminist writing as either reformist or
revolutionary, a dualism which, for example, Weeks (2011, p. 228) rejects, the books
under consideration here do draw on both reformist and revolutionary ideas. However,
they are much more than that; they are works which are actively concerned with
processes of re-conceptualisation.
The Metaphysics of Gender
Charlotte Witt’s argument in The Metaphysics of Gender is complex, but may be sum-
marised as the claim that the social roles we occupy are unified by gender, gender is the
function that organises our social roles, and gender is ‘uniessential’. Witt enters the highly
contested debate on essentialism with this book and she does so with a notion of
essentialism taken from Aristotle. Gender (a function) is uniessential (a functional prop-
erty) to social individuals (an entity) – what makes us who we are, as social individuals,
is gender. Therefore, we have a number of social roles which we inhabit, often at the
same time (e.g. parent, professional, friend), and these are united by one function: gender.
Gender is a social norm and, as such, it unites the social roles we occupy and conditions
our practical agency: the expectations and obligations which arise from our gender trump
all others. This approach to essentialism is not the same as ‘traditional’ feminist debates on
the subject. Alison Stone notes that arguments about essentialism have taken either a
‘natural’ or a socially constructed view of women ‘whereby a particular pattern of social
construction is essential and universal to all women’ (Stone, 2007, p. 27, note 5). Both
views came to be criticised because both ascribed ‘necessary and common characteristics
to all women’ (Stone, 2007, p. 18). So essentialism in feminist theory has been concerned
with a highly problematic search for some feature which all women share. However,
Witt’s concern is different; she aims to explore the metaphysics of essentialism. Her
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analysis demonstrates how gender norms are constituted, how our social roles are
gendered in a variety of ways.
Our social positions depend on social recognition and this varies depending on both
cultural and historical contexts (Witt, 2011, pp. 29–30). Witt argues that an individual is
both responsive to, and evaluable under, a social norm. In being responsive, the indi-
vidual (self-consciously or not) calibrates their behaviour according to a social norm: even
when reacting against a norm, an individual can be understood to be responsive to it
(Witt, 2011, pp. 31–2). Witt’s account of social normativity is ascriptivist in that an
individual is evaluated by social norms regardless of whether or not she identifies with
them: even an individual who rebels against her social position is as responsive to, and
evaluable under, that identity as is the individual who complies with it (Witt, 2011, p.
43). Witt argues that the account of ascriptivism is valuable to feminist theory for two
reasons: (1) it explains why women appear subject to social norms regardless of whether
or not they endorse them; and (2) feminist criticism should be directed against the norms
themselves and ‘restrictive social positions’ (Witt, 2011, p. 47).
Witt separates the social individual from persons and from human organisms (together,
these three form the self ). Social individuals occupy a social position; in fact, we tend
to occupy numerous social positions and we are all subject to the norms that go with
these. Persons are individuals with a first-person perspective (they are self-conscious, can
think for themselves) and ‘a necessary condition for the possibility of autonomy’ (Witt,
2011, p. 54). Social individuals exist in the social world, but persons do not need a social
world in order to exist (Witt, 2011, p. 56). The term ‘human organism’ refers to
membership of the human species. The distinction between persons and social individ-
uals is difficult to grasp and appears to rely on Witt’s ascriptivist account of social
normativity: identity is fixed by social position: it can be chosen, embraced, or it can be
thrust upon us, and we merely react it to it (Witt, 2011, p. 63). Breaking down the self
into three parts appears conceptually difficult and is, perhaps, unnecessary as the three are
ineluctably linked and despite the capacity for self-reflection, the individual is a self who
occupies a social position that is not of her choosing but which is ascribed to her by her
culture or society (Witt, 2011, p. 126). The functions of a person are curtailed by those
of the social individual. Critical reflection – the ability to think for ourselves – can be
limited by our social location because gender essentialism is a social phenomenon and it
takes place at the level of the social individual. For Witt, essentialism is not biological
(at the level of organisms) because gender is a social construct and the liberal focus on
our capacity for self-reflection (at the level of persons) does not rescue the self from
essentialism because persons are not gendered – social individuals are (Witt, 2011, p. 58).
This is a very brief discussion and Witt appears to feel it is sufficient to explain her
notion of gender as being a distinctly social phenomenon. Witt does not fully engage
with important thinkers in this debate. For example, on Witt’s account identity is
experienced by social individuals but seemingly chosen by persons. On this point
engagement with some of the literature on gender and agency such as Butler’s theory
of gender as performance would have been useful (Butler, 1990; Lloyd, 2007). As it is,
Butler’s work gets only two brief mentions (on pp. 8 and 35). Witt acknowledges de
Beauvoir’s work ([1949]1997) on the social positions of men and of women, but does
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not go into any detail (Witt, 2011, p. 42). Witt’s feminist argument appears to amount
to the claim she makes on page 47 – that feminist criticism should be directed towards
oppressive social norms – but she does not explain at any length how uniessentialism
does this work.
Witt argues that the social role which unifies us is gender and not race. She conceives
the unifying social role, or the ‘mega social role’, as that which organises ‘fundamental
social functions’. Our society is organised by patriarchy, and there ‘are no fundamental
social functions organized by race; we can see this by noting that the existence of races
is variable: not all societies recognize racial differentiation, and not all of them recognize
the same racial categories’ (Witt, 2011, p. 102). Gender norms can be inflected by race,
but gender is prior in its ability to define and to organise social roles. Witt argues that this
view can be compatible with the literature on intersectionality and gives the following
example: ‘as Black feminists have noted, the issue of women in the workplace has an
entirely different set of norms for Black women than it does for Caucasian women’
(Witt, 2011, p. 101). However, this argument is rather brief and it fails to engage with
intersectionality’s criticism that there is a need ‘to account for lived experience at
neglected points of intersection – ones that tended to reflect multiple subordinate
locations as opposed to dominant or mixed locations’ (McCall, 2005, p. 1780), and more
recent criticisms of what Mridula Nath Chakraborty calls ‘hegemonic feminism’
(Chakraborty, 2007). The notion of a ‘mega’ social role seems incompatible with the
more nuanced accounts of intersectionality available.
While it may appear that Witt is covering some familiar territory, she does shine light
on the metaphysics of this territory. Even so, it would have been interesting to see more
engagement with some of the work on essentialism, and, most of all, Witt needed to do
more to defend her claim that gender is the ‘mega’ social role she says it is. Surely the
point of the intersectionality literature is that race is as significant as gender and certainly
that women experience oppression in different ways. Although the latter point might fit
with Witt’s argument that, logically, women can experience oppression in different ways
even though it is also a common experience because of the engendering social norm, it
does not even skim the surface of the ways in which women oppress other women.
Witt’s rejection of race as a mega social role and the discussion of essentialism in feminist
theory are both too cursory, and Ruth Abbey’s approach to the literature on
intersectionality is much more thorough.
The Return of Feminist Liberalism
Ruth Abbey’s book provides in-depth analyses of the work of three contemporary
feminists: Susan Moller Okin, Jean Hampton and Martha Nussbaum.1 Abbey argues that
what unites these three thinkers is that their body of work operates within the parameters
of liberalism, with each thinker working towards a reconfiguration of liberalism, rather
than a rejection of it (Abbey, 2011, p. 4). Abbey acknowledges that, for each of her
chosen subjects, there are problems with using liberalism for feminist purposes but, rather
than reject liberalism because of its limitations, the goal of each thinker has been to
reconfigure liberalism in order to make it compatible with feminism. She approaches the
three authors’ theories by analysing the ways in which Okin’s work is used in that of
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Hampton and Nussbaum. Abbey contrasts Okin’s advocacy of shared meanings with the
universalism of liberalism. She argues that Hampton is an ‘accidental contractarian’ and
that the ‘real normative and theoretical work is done by her Kantian belief in the intrinsic
worth of each person that should be respected in most human association’ (Abbey,
2011, p. 3). With Nussbaum, Abbey examines the ‘human capabilities approach’ and
scrutinises ‘the problem that adaptive preferences pose for Nussbaum’s feminist liberalism’
(Abbey, 2011, p. 4). Abbey’s review of feminist liberalism places Rawls at the centre of
liberalism because of Okin’s emphasis on the family and the basic structure, Hampton’s
contractarian and Kantian approach, and Nussbaum’s political liberalism and capabilities
approach (Abbey, 2011, p. 5). The engagement of these feminists with the work of
Rawls can, according to Abbey, be understood as reciprocal: his work provides fertile
ground for rethinking feminist liberalism (in the diverse ways listed above) but, in
addition, these feminist criticisms of Rawls make a significant contribution to an assess-
ment of his work and its legacy (Abbey, 2011, p. 6).
Abbey appears to argue that feminist liberalism is making a return because although
liberalism has largely been dismissed by many feminists in recent decades, some have
continued to find valuable aspects in liberalism for feminism (Abbey, 2011, p. 2). Abbey
also notes a need for feminist theory to return to liberalism as it is, she argues, largely
liberal values which have enabled feminist success in practice, here she points to achieve-
ments such as increased access for women to the workplace, political institutions and
higher education (Abbey, 2011, pp. 7–8). Throughout, Abbey refers to ‘feminist liber-
alism’ rather than ‘liberal feminism’, and she provides three reasons for this. First, this is
because the thinkers to whom she refers approach feminism as ‘an extension of their
liberalism’ (Abbey, 2011, p. 8). Second, ‘feminist liberalism’ adopts a distinctly non-
masculine approach and seeks, for example, to apply ‘liberal values across the public-
private divide’ (Abbey, 2011, p. 9). Finally, emphasis on ‘feminist liberalism’ helps to
express the ‘variety of forms contemporary liberalism takes’ (Abbey, 2011, p. 9). Abbey
highlights a number of points of connection between Okin, Hampton and Nussbaum,
such as the demands they make of the state and their engagement with, and criticism of,
the public-private divide. Abbey highlights one particular area of interest addressed by all
three thinkers: diversity among women.
She reflects on the calls for equality made by Okin, Hampton and Nussbaum in the
form of justice, moral personhood and global justice, but she is also critical of the ways
in which these thinkers struggle to recognise differences among women in the pursuit of
equality. She questions the degree to which Okin’s work engages with such differences,
and she argues that Okin should be more concerned with the literature on
intersectionality because it is concerned with ‘women’s self-interpretations’ – the idea
that different women may experience the same phenomenon differently (Abbey, 2011, p.
98). Attention to women’s self-interpretation fits with Okin’s interest in using empirical
work (women’s self-interpretation would appear to be a valuable resource), her use of
women’s own experiences and understanding of their situation, and her Kantian insist-
ence that women be understood, by themselves and others, as ends in themselves (Abbey,
2011, pp. 100–1). Abbey also finds that Hampton’s work is unable to deal satisfactorily
with the criticisms raised in the literature on intersectionality. She notes that Hampton’s
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analysis of rape is Kantian rather than feminist, which means that for Hampton the act
of rape is wrong because it ignores the right of the victim to be treated as a moral equal.
This does not take into account self-interpretations, ‘the meaning of rape can depend
on particular features of the perpetrator(s) and the recipient’ (Abbey, 2011, p. 138).
Hampton’s approach, Abbey argues, focuses on an abstract and universal argument that
inequality, discrimination and violence against women are wrong because they do not
respect the intrinsic worth of each human being (Abbey, 2011, p. 141).
Abbey finds Nussbaum guilty of making generalisations about women, or aggregating
women’s experiences (Abbey, 2011, p. 162). Although, in Nussbaum’s defence, Abbey
points out that Nussbaum ‘seems to make room for attention to women’s diverse
self-interpretations’ (Abbey, 2011, p. 164), she then cautions us to be aware of the
problem of adaptive preferences in Nussbaum’s work. Adaptive preferences arise from
situations in which women face limited options and respond by becoming ‘satisfied with,
and attached to, what they have or can achieve, so that their stated preferences reflect
their subordination and shrunken horizons’ (Abbey, 2011, p. 174). This is similar to the
problem Witt highlights – oppressive social positions can limit our capacity for self-
reflection. It is a problem for feminist liberalism because free choice is valuable for
liberals, but a feminist perspective also alerts us to the way oppression works to limit an
individual’s perception of what options are permitted in his/her subordinate social
position (Abbey, 2011, pp. 174–5) and, therefore, some choices are open to critique.
Abbey quotes Anne Phillips (2001): ‘Nussbaum’s dilemma reflects the fact that she is
“simultaneously hooked on the idea of choice and critical of most people’s choices” ’
(Abbey, 2011, p. 176). There is a problem with divorcing intuitions about what is
valuable from individual preferences – should we value preferences which could result
from ‘adaptation to injustice’ (Abbey, 2011, p. 176)? Women appear to make choices
which are not to their benefit and ‘Okin, Hampton and Nussbaum advocate a range of
techniques to rectify the fact that many women make choices that work to their
disadvantage’ (Abbey, 2011, p. 179). These techniques include demanding the state
mandate equal pay or, less specifically, raising women’s awareness of their equal moral
worth (Abbey, 2011, p. 179).
Abbey argues that, for these thinkers, the overall category of ‘women’ is still useful
because all women are oppressed in similar ways, but none of the thinkers denies the
impact of factors such as race or poverty. These feminist liberals have the tools – in the
form of moral individualism – to engage in a critique of all forms of oppression, ‘for a
society that permits individuals to be disadvantaged in these ways fails to respect the
dignity and equal personhood of all its members’ (Abbey, 2011, pp. 216–7). Whereas
Witt sees a need for feminism to focus on the social roles of women, Abbey’s emphasis
is on individualism as a way of tackling women’s inequality. In highlighting issues of
intersectionality and of adaptive preferences, Abbey demonstrates the potential of femi-
nist liberalism to deal with these feminist issues while maintaining liberal emphasis on
individuality.
In her conclusion, Abbey acknowledges that there are ‘shortcomings’ to the way in
which Okin, Hampton and Nussbaum address, or indeed fail to address, differences
among women and argues that both their liberalism and their feminism demands that
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greater attention be paid to differences for four reasons. First, their rejection of a priori
gendering of humans means not only that their feminist liberalism does not hold that
women should be like men in order to qualify for moral consideration, but also that there
can be no generalised standard for what it means to be a woman. Second, the liberal
tradition in which these feminists work has been valuable to them because it supports ‘the
normative resources’ with which to challenge unjust hierarchies and differences in power.
It is, therefore, within the means of feminist liberals to challenge the unjust hierarchies
to which the literature on intersectionality draws attention. Third, as has been noted,
these theorists are Rawlsian feminist liberals and, as such, they should be concerned with
women’s self-interpretation in order to understand how this either fits or rubs up against
principles of justice (after all, principles of justice should be accepted by all rather than
imposed on some) (Abbey, 2011, p. 263). Abbey concludes this point with a warning: ‘if
feminist liberals fail to attend to women’s diverse self-interpretations, they render them-
selves unable to consider how heavily their recommendations might fall on some
members of society’ (Abbey, 2011, pp. 269–70). And finally, incorporating differences
between women calls on the mobilisation of the Kantian conception of the person:
women need to see themselves as ‘ends in themselves’, and not means to the ends of
others, and here Abbey argues that this ‘is necessary but not sufficient for a change in
women’s self-understandings’ (Abbey, 2011, p. 271). This position fits with her earlier
criticism of Hampton for relying on this conception in her analysis of rape. Treating
people as ends in themselves does not highlight how different women experience and
interpret such acts differently.
For feminist liberals, then, the fact of women’s oppression demands an emphasis on
women’s diverse experiences (while managing the problem of adaptive preferences) and
an emphasis on women’s moral equality with men. Part of the initial appeal of liberal
feminism was its desire to achieve the ‘achievable’ to bring about women’s rights, and the
fact that its goals, now in the form of feminist liberalism, have to be less specific and have
a broader focus does not mean that this version of feminism has lost its desire for reform.
It still seeks to confront the patriarchal elements of liberalism, but it also means that
feminism and liberalism continue to engage in a dialogue, challenging each other’s
theoretical views. Abbey’s feminist liberalism is then involved in a process of theoretical
dialogue between two evolving traditions: feminism and liberalism.
The Problem with Work: Feminism, Marxism, Antiwork Politics and
Postwork Imaginaries
In The Problem with Work, Kathi Weeks combines feminist and non-feminist approaches
in the form of Marxist, Marxist feminist and utopian thought. As the title suggests,
feminism is one element of her analysis, and her focus on work and the way in which
society functions around work also have strong implications for feminist theory – not
least in the way in which she challenges the assumption that when alternatives to work
are theorised, a common response is to turn to the family. This has obviously created
limitations for women in terms of seeing their options located in either work or family.
Weeks’ book addresses the concept of a ‘postwork’ society. She argues that we need
to engage with the meaning of waged work not only because it is so significant to our
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lives (the means by which we acquire necessary goods – food, clothes and shelter), but
because ‘it is also the basic means by which status is allocated, and by which most people
gain access to healthcare and retirement’ (Weeks, 2011, p. 6). She goes on to argue that
work is a process of subject making and, indeed, ‘a site of gendering’ (Weeks, 2011, p.
9). Work is organised through gender – ‘the productivity of gender-differentiated labor’
constructs the workplace and the home ‘including the gendered division of the house-
hold roles and waged occupations’ (Weeks, 2011, p. 9).
Weeks develops an argument for a ‘postwork society’ through a number of avenues
including Weber’s analysis of the Protestant work ethic (which she uses to expose the
irrationality of that ethic), and two accounts of Marxism which she labels ‘socialist
modernization’ and ‘socialist humanism’, both of which are rejected in favour of the
autonomist Marxist tradition. Weeks also explores the Marxist feminist ‘Wages for
Housework’ campaign, and the potential of utopian thought for advancing a postwork
society. Of these, the latter three are given most attention and appear to be most
significant to her argument.
Weeks’ objection to Marx’s critique of the work ethic, or the very idea of the work
ethic, is that the alternative he provides is not an actual remedy to the system of which
he is so critical. For Marx, work, albeit reformulated, remains necessary, and he does not
posit an alternative (Weeks, 2011, p. 91). Accordingly, Weeks (2011, p. 92) turns to the
autonomous Marxist tradition and, in particular, she draws on the work of Antonio
Negri. She reads Negri as providing an alternative future in which work as it currently
exists is rejected as a viable strategy and is instead transformed (Weeks, 2011, pp. 100–1).
Weeks provides a reading of the 1970s Marxist feminist ‘Wages for Housework’ cam-
paign and reworks it ‘as a contemporary demand for guaranteed basic income’ (Weeks,
2011, p. 113). She focuses particularly on the work of Mariarosa Dalla Costa and Selma
James and argues that the demand for wages for housework was meant neither to
‘celebrate’ nor to ‘sanctify’ work which involved a rejection of the gendered division of
labour and a refusal to engage with ‘some all-too-familiar romanticization of the domestic
realm’s relations and rituals’ (Weeks, 2011, p. 124). Weeks points out that those involved
with the campaign ‘rejected not only the capitalist but also the socialist remedies defended
by other feminists at the time’ (Weeks, 2011, p. 125). She argues that the Wages for
Housework campaign interested Dalla Costa and James (1973) ‘initially at least, as a
mechanism for the development of feminist subjectivity’ (Weeks, 2011, p. 127). Here she
draws parallels with the project of autonomous Marxism. She also emphasises the power
and potential of making a demand – something which is both a perspective (renders
visible the issue of women’s place in society) and a provocation (a call to action through
various means such as commitment to a cause or formation of a collectivity) (Weeks,
2011, pp. 128–31).
For Weeks, the struggle against oppressive working hours should be considered part of
the same demand as the struggle against the family structure of reproductive labour
(Weeks, 2011, p. 152). Weeks, like Witt and Abbey, is returning to sites of contestation
and disagreement and like the others she does so in order to move forwards. Weeks uses
the refusal of work as a tool with which to reconfigure three aspects of Marxist
feminism: ‘publicising work, politicizing it and radically transforming it’ (Weeks, 2011,
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p. 24). Publicising work involved drawing attention to reproductive labour – labour
which was socially necessary but not financially rewarded. Publicising this drew attention
to the fact that time spent outside (paid) work was not leisure time, it was unpaid work
time. Yet even Marxist feminism did not go far enough in reconfiguring work, it
challenged the organisation of work but it did not directly challenge the value placed on
work (Weeks, 2011, p. 25), for a criticism of work’s value, Weeks turns to Autonomous
Marxism. Therefore, Weeks’ project involves a reading of Marxist feminism, combined
with the Autonomous Marxism literature, in so doing she reinvigorates Marxist feminism
in general and the ‘Wages for Housework’ campaign in particular. In agreement with
Hemmings, Weeks conceives the story of feminism as ‘not only a story of progress but
also sometimes ... of forgotten ideas and stifled aspirations’ (Weeks, 2011, p. 117). She
argues that her interest is in re-engagement with forgotten ideas to challenge the present
‘and reinvigorate its possible futures’ (Weeks, 2011, p. 117). Weeks argues for what she
sees as a ‘transfigurative politics’ which contains the possibility for future subjectivity – ‘a
process of creating new subjectivities with new capacities and desires, and, eventually,
new demands’. Time spent not working can be theorised as time which contains
‘potential social productivity’ (Weeks, 2011, p. 169). This opens up the possibility of
imagining alternatives to the present ‘dominant ideals’ of both work and family (Weeks,
2011, p. 170). This, she argues, creates the possibility for a more inclusive feminism.
In her final chapter, Weeks shifts focus to the utopian potential of a demand for
shorter working hours. Weeks analyses what she refers to as ‘utopian artefacts’, but she
is also interested in the function of utopia (Weeks, 2011, p. 204). Weeks approaches this
body of literature by analysing it in the context of two features: one of estrangement
(which functions to ‘alter our connection to the present’), and one of hope (which
provides ‘provocations toward alternatives’ and therefore looks to the future) (Weeks,
2011, pp. 204–5). Estrangement takes us out of our setting and renders it unfamiliar: in
so doing, it provides us with a point from which to engage critically with the present
(Weeks, 2011, p. 205). The second function – hope – provokes a desire to act and
inspires our political imagination. It also provides a force for mobilisation: ‘utopias can
serve as inspirational models; they can help to activate political will, to mobilize and
organize movements for social change’ (Weeks, 2011, p. 206). Weeks argues that utopian
visions need not serve as blueprints, but they do ‘do the work of estrangement and
provocation’ (Weeks, 2011, p. 211).
Weeks returns to the idea of making a demand. Inevitably, a demand is made in the
realm of practical and, indeed, pragmatic politics (Weeks, 2011, p. 219), but a demand
which is utopian is ‘necessarily larger in scope’ than a policy proposal (Weeks, 2011, p.
220). Weeks argues that the central idea of the utopian demand is that it can be both
reformist and revolutionary (Weeks, 2011, p. 228). The refusal of work raises important
questions for feminism, for what takes the place of the ‘privatized family’, and for the
‘structures of production and reproduction’ (Weeks, 2011, pp. 110–1). For Weeks the
answer is ‘life’. A demand for the reform of working hours and basic income is reformist,
but championing ‘the political project of “life against work” is a general rubric within
which to frame the kinds of antiwork critiques and postwork imaginaries represented
here by the demands for basic income and shorter hours’ (Weeks, 2011, p. 230).
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Accordingly, Weeks aims to juxtapose life with work (Weeks, 2011, p. 231) and this
opens up a number of possibilities for thinking about future conceptions of work. The
juxtaposition is an interesting idea, but it is given very little space.
Weeks’ final chapter is perhaps the most engaging of the book and the notion of a
utopian demand offers hope not only for Weeks’ concept of a postwork society, but for
feminist theory as a whole. Weeks’ feminism combines the real with the possible and calls
on the imagination to help in this process. The possibility of conceiving a future radically
different from, but connected to, the present or, in the words of Catriona Mackenzie,
‘imagining ourselves otherwise’ (Mackenzie, 2000), is key to Weeks in the struggle
against oppression. It could also be a route endorsed by Witt whose work highlights the
problem of oppressive social roles, but then leaves to feminist theory the task of tackling
them (Witt, 2011, p. 132).
Conclusion
The work of these three theorists involves a process of transformation, returning,
re-conceptualisation and an ongoing belief that change is still possible. Contemporary
feminism has taken on the issues of identity I raised in the introduction with essentialism
being described by Jane Spencer as ‘a battle constantly revisited’ (Spencer, 2007, p. 300).
Issues raised in the second wave which created arguments around intersectionality are
being discussed in third wave criticisms of more recent attempts to create a universal
identity of woman. For example, recent movements such as feminist punk movement
‘Riot Grrrl’ have drawn criticism for their failure to understand sexism in the wider
context of racial and class oppression (Munford, 2007, p. 272). Finally, after the many
challenges to the notion that ‘woman’ could ever be a homogenous group from Black,
post-modern and post-structuralist feminists, contemporary feminism is very sensitive to
diversity and difference. The three books reviewed here respond, to varying degrees, to
these issues. Witt deals directly with essentialism, Abbey with the challenge of
intersectionality for feminist theory and the means of incorporating diversity and differ-
ence. Weeks’ book is a broader take on these themes: she provides a feminist analysis of
work and the way in which it defines us as subjects. Each book returns to important
features of the feminist debate (essentialism, liberal feminism and the Marxist feminist
‘Wages for Housework’ campaign) and in so doing each author demonstrates agreement
with Hemmings’ arguments that telling the story of feminism is not a story of displace-
ment but is rather one of returning, reconceptualisation and reinvigorating these key
feminist ideas. All tackle social roles and prescribed identity, Witt through the gendering
of social roles, Abbey draws attention to the need for engagement with women’s diverse
self-interpretations and Weeks looks at the gendering of both work roles and non-work
roles. In different ways, the books discussed here draw attention to future possibilities for
feminism: the alteration of gender norms which are oppressive; feminist liberalism
reinvigorated; utopian demands for a better life. There is no single feminist response to
the problem of inequality: each of the thinkers frames the problem differently and,
therefore, each posits different political solutions. In getting on with the task of doing
feminist theory, these authors demonstrate that the problem feminism faces is not
necessarily one of definition – it is the ongoing fact of women’s oppression. The varied
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debates on how to tackle gender oppression are still flowing, regardless of whichever
wave sets them down on our shore.
(Accepted: 2 November 2013)
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Thanks also to Lucy Sargisson for suggesting I write this piece.
1 Hampton and Nussbaum have written specifically on feminism but also on other topics and Abbey confines her analysis to the
former works.
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